Systems-Theoretic Accident Modeling and Process (STAMP) is a novel accident causality model and has been used in various areas. Most of the STAMP based hazard analysis methods are ad-hoc without rigorous procedures, and the process model used in STAMP is too simple to identify the hazardous control actions as the causes. Petri nets, which have been used to graphically model computer-controlled systems and resolve system safety issues, can make the hazard analysis with STAMP more effective. To identify the hazardous control actions in the STAMP-based hazard analysis, extended Petri nets are proposed in this paper to model the control processes in the system control structure. The runtime control action failures are considered in the reachability graph for the hazard analysis. Furthermore, the types of hazardous control actions are studied and analyzed in the extended reachability graph.
Introduction
Both component failure accidents and component interaction accidents frequently occur due to the complexity of computercontrolled systems [1] [2] . Since the hazards are potential system states or sets of conditions that can result in accidents, they can be used to prevent accidents beforehand [3] . As a result, hazard analysis is critical for identifying causal factors to ensure system safety.
Based on the traditional event-chain accident model, the hazard analysis methods such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) identify the component failures as the causes of accidents and overlook causes like dysfunctional component interactions and software errors [1, 4] , so they cannot be used in the hazard analysis of computer-controlled systems [5] .
With the purpose of overcoming the limitations of traditional approaches, Systems-Theoretic Accident Modeling and Processes (STAMP) [6] was published to capture more types of causal factors such as dysfunctional interactions among non-failed components, design flaws, and requirements flaws. Therefore, it could be useful for analyzing the accidents in computer-controlled systems [4] [5] . According to STAMP, the inadequate controls, which lead to safety constraints not being enforced on the system behavior, are regarded as the causes of accidents. The STAMP-based method System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) [7] is proposed to identify the Hazardous Control Action (HCA), which can violate the safety-related constraints and lead to system hazards, as the cause of hazards for the control processes in systems [4, 8] . However, STPA has no rigorous procedures to help the analyst in its application, and the component-interactions are not specified in the process model.
Although some support tools, such as A-STPA [9] and SAHRA [10] , are presented to assist the STAMP-based hazard analysis, these tools focus on maintaining the consistency or traceability of the information used in the analysis process and do not provide a systematic way to perform the hazard analysis. In addition, Thomas [5] extends the STPA analysis with Context Table to consider all the possible environmental conditions for each control action. Asim [11] optimizes the extended STPA method with a pairwise algorithm to reduce the size of Context Table. These extended STPA methods determine whether the control action in an environmental condition will lead to system hazards and elicit the HCAs from the system control structure. The situation that control actions use to handle the system hazards in the context is not considered in the extended STPA methods. Also, because the extended STPA methods examine one control action at a time, they have limitations when analyzing the sequence of control actions when there are multiple controllers in the system control structure. One of the causes for these limitations is that the control processes are not specified formally in STPA, and thus they cannot be analyzed effectively.
Petri nets have been used in many computer-controlled systems to simulate the control process and analyze system safety [12] . They can deal with sequencing, state transitions, and timing in hazard analysis. Specifically, with the help of the reachability graph of Petri nets, the causes of hazard can be determined [13] . Unlike the Component Interaction Automata and the UML tool Interaction Overview Diagram, which only describe the control process while using model checkers to analyze the properties of a system, the hazard analysis of a computer-controlled system with Petri nets does not rely on the other tools [14] [15] . Therefore, based on STAMP, an efficient method is needed for control process modeling and hazard analysis with Petri nets.
To analyze the causes of hazards with Petri nets based on the STAMP causality model, the Control Logical Petri Net (CLPN) is presented to model the control process in the system control structure. Then, the control action failures in the control process are considered and extended to the reachability graph of CLPN. Afterward, as the causal factors based on STAMP, the HCAs are studied and further identified in the extended reachability graph of CLPN. In summary, the following contributions have been made in this paper: (1) The logical transition and a special arc are extended in CLPN with the purpose of modeling the complex control constraints in control processes and reducing the size of the control process model. (2) A reachability graph extending method is proposed to consider the failures of control actions and is further used to analyze the causes of hazards. Since the reachability graph of CLPN is extended backward from the hazardous states with the failure of the control action, rather than extending the failures in the Petri nets and generating the reachability graph for hazard analysis in traditional methods [15] [16] , the reachability graph extending method can mitigate the state space explosion to a certain extent. (3) A method is proposed to analyze the hazardous states in the reachability graph and identify the HCAs as the causes based on the STAMP model.
Control Process Modeling
According to STAMP, the control processes between different levels of the hierarchical system control structure enforce constraints on the lower level by control actions [1] . The control processes can be summarized into two types: (1) Control Transmission is among different levels in the control structure. The control actions received by the component of high level are transferred or decomposed to the components of lower levels; (2) Control Interaction is the control processes between the components of the same level in the control structure. Components affect each other directly or indirectly to achieve the goals of control. Because the Control Interaction is the control process in the same abstraction/refinement level of the system, whereas the Control Transmission can be regarded as the decomposition or refinement of control processes, the Control Interaction is studied in this paper with the purpose of analyzing the hazards in the control process of the same abstraction level.
Control Logic Petri Net
With the purpose of assisting the STAMP based hazard analysis and identifying the causal factors effectively, the control process is first modeled formally with Petri nets in this paper. However, there are several limitations of the traditional Petri nets: (1) Most Petri nets have difficulty in describing the complex control logic of control processes. (2) For most Petri nets, the tokens in input places will be consumed after the transition is fired, and this changes the pre-conditions of the transition. However, the context condition may not be affected by the firing of transitions or occurrence of events in control processes.
Based on Logic Petri nets [17] and Contextual Petri nets [18] , the Petri nets are extended as follows to overcome those limitations: 1) Logical transition is introduced to describe complex control logics and constraints in control processes. For the logical input expressions that are attached to the logic transition, the size of the control process model is reduced.
2) A special arc is extended to describe the context condition of transitions in control processes. The tokens of input places connected with the special arc will not be consumed by the transition firing.
The extended Petri nets proposed in this paper are defined as Definition 1. 2) = ∪ is a finite nonempty set of transitions with ∩ = ∅, where CA is the set of logical transitions and E is the set of normal transitions. ∀ ∈ , a logical input expression f(t) is attached to t.
is a finite set of directed edges, where FN denotes normal arcs, ⊆ × is the special arcs that the tokens of ∈ will not be consumed by the transition ∈ , and ∩ = ∅.
4) is a mapping from logical transitions to logical expressions, i.e., ∀ ∈ , I(t)=f(t).
5)
: → {0, 1} is the making. ∀ ∈ , ( ) denotes the token number in p.
6) Transition firing rules: 
According to the definition of CLPN, FR arcs will not affect the marking changing of CLPN, and as a result, they have no effect on the reachability graph analysis of the Petri nets [19] . Similar to the logic input transition of Logic Petri nets [20] , [21] , the modeling power of CLPN is improved by the logic transition CA, and the reachability graph analysis method of Petri nets still can be used in the CLPN analysis.
Control Process Modeling with CLPN
According to STAMP, four types of information are required to specify the control process: (1) Safety constraints, which are usually enforced by the control logic of the controller in control structure. (2) Control action, which is generated by the controller to affect the state of systems. (3) Feedback information and context information, which are needed to generate the control action. (4) Controlled system/process, which contains information of the system variables and is used to generate the control action. In the CLPN model, the places can be used to describe the feedback and context information, which usually are expressed by the system variable states. The CA transition can be used to express the control action in control processes. Also, the logical expressions attached to CA transitions as well as the FR arcs can be used to express safety constraints enforced by complex control logics. The control interaction in control processes can be modeled with CLPN by Algorithm 1:
Algorithm 1 Control processes modeling:
Input: Constraints of each control action, system control structure.
Output: CLPN models of control processes.
Step 1 Feedback and context information modeling. For each system variable received by the controller, denote the system variable states by places and express the transitions among them with CLPN.
Step 2 Control logic expressing. For each control action in the system control structure, generate the CA transitions marked 'CA' in CLPN. For each system variable state of safety constraints enforced by control action, generate the corresponding places in CLPN. Express the safety constraint of each control action with arcs F and f() attached to CA transitions.
Step 3 Controlled system/process modeling. According to the state machines of system variables, generate the corresponding normal transitions E and FN arcs. Figure 1 shows the CLPN of a simple railroad crossing system, which detects the states of the train and raises/lowers the gate when the train is past/approaching. The places {P1, P2, P3}, {P4, P5} represent the system variable states of the context and the controlled system respectively. The CA transition marked with 'CA' denotes a control action. The CA transitions t3: DOWN and t4: UP is restricted by their provided constraints 'I(t3)=f(t3)=(Train=Approach)⋀ (Gate=GateUp)' and 'I(t4)=f(t4)=(Train=Past)⋀ (Gate=GateDown)' respectively. Because the system is simplified, the constraints of the control action in Figure 1 are not very complex. The FN and FR arcs are expressed by solid arrows and dotted arrows respectively. With the help of firing rule 6)b) of Definition 1, because there are tokens in places P1 and P4 of Figure 1 , f(t3)=TRUE and t3 is enabled. Also, following firing rule 6)c), the tokens in places connected with the FR arcs cannot be consumed during transition firing. For instance, the token in place P1 will not be removed by the firing of transition t3, whereas the token in place P4, which is connected with FN arcs, will be transferred to P5 when the transition t3 is fired. In the example of Figure 1 , there is a hazard when a train is in the crossing (P2) and the guard gate is up (P4). According to the predetermined system hazards, all the hazardous states expressed by markings, such as the marking (0, 1, 0, 1, 0) , can be identified in the reachability graph and must be further analyzed with the purpose of obtaining the causes. 
Reachability Graph Extending
When performing hazard analysis for the control process, the run-time control action failures must be considered. Rather than modeling failures with failure transitions and fault places in Petri nets directly [15] [16] , which will rapidly increase the scale and complexity of the reachability graph, the failure of the control action is used to extend the reachability graph backward from the hazardous state in this paper. Because some system variable states of the hazard only can be affected by particular control actions, the failures of these control actions should be considered to extend the reachability graph backward. For the hazardous state M2: (0, 1, 0, 1, 0) in the reachability graph of Figure 1 , only the control action t4 can lead to the system variable state = GateUp. The failure of t4 is considered and used to generate the immediately prior state M5: (0, 1, 0, 0, 1), which is already in the graph.
Working backward from hazardous states with the purpose of extending the reachability graph with control action failures is practical in order to reduce the number of failure transitions in the reachability graph. However, some states generated in this process may be unreachable from the initial state [15] and make the reachability graph incorrect. Therefore, the reachability of the prior states generated for failure transitions should be examined. Since the failure transition is a possible way for a new state to be reached, the new 'one-step-backward' states, which are unreachable, should continue extending backward with control action failures. As a result, there may be some extended states that are reachable from the initial state through several control action failures in the extended reachability graph. The probability of the failure is usually very small, and a threshold value k is used to limit the maximum number of control action failures in the path of the reachability graph. If there are k consecutive new generated states in the backward extending process from a hazardous state, then all the k new states are considered to be unreachable and should be removed from the reachability graph. An extending algorithm for the reachability graph is given as follows.
Algorithm 2: Reachability graph extending algorithm:
Input: The reachability graph of CLPN model, the control actions in the control processes.
Output: The extended reachability graph.
Step 1 For each hazardous states in the reachability graph, chose the control actions which act on the system variables of the hazardous state.
Step 2 Generate the immediately prior state or states for the hazardous states in consideration of failures of the control action identified in Step 1.
Step 3 Examine the reachability of each 'one-step-backward' state from the initial state. If it is already in the reachability graph, add the states and the corresponding path to the reachability graph.
Step 4 Otherwise, iterate Step 2 and Step 3 to take into account all the normal situation and failures of the control actions, until all the prior states are reachable through k failure transitions at most, where k is the previously set threshold value. Figure 2 shows the extended reachability graph of CLPN in Figure 1 . The marking M2, which is expressed by rectangle, is a hazardous state. For control action CA, the failure of CA is expressed as CA-f. According to Algorithm 2, all the prior states for hazardous state M2 are already in the reachability graph, and only the control action failure t4-f, which can occur in the undesired condition M5 and change the system variable Gate from GateDown to GateUp, is extended to the reachability graph. Algorithm 2 uses the backward method to extend the reachability graph from a relatively small number of hazardous states, and only the control action failures and faulty states that related to the hazards are added. In other words, rather than specifying the failures with failure transitions and fault places in Petri nets [15] , which will generate a large number of faulty states and paths with failures in the reachability graph, only the failure paths from the safe state to hazardous states are extended to the reachability graph in the backward method. As a result, the scale of the reachability graph extended backward is much smaller than that generated by the forward methods, which include many fail-safe paths [22] . Also, all the information needed for analyzing the causal factors of hazardous states is included in the extended reachability graph. 
Safety Analysis with Extended Reachability Graph
The extended reachability graph of CLPN, which shows all of the possible system states and sequences of transitions in the control process, can be used to analyze the effects of the transition sequences and identify more types of causal factors based on STAMP. As the causal factor of STAMP, the HCA is the control action that provides inadequate control in the control process and can lead the system to hazardous states. There are four types of HCA [23] : (1) HCA-1: The control action to enforce safety constraints is not provided or followed; (2) HCA-2: An unsafe control action is provided and causes a hazard; (3) HCA-3: A potentially safe control action is provided at the wrong time or sequence; (4) HCA-4: A safe continuous control action is stopped too soon or applied too long. The HCA can be expressed as a tuple (SC, TP, CA, Co) formally [5] , where SC is the controller that issues control action CA in the context Co of the system, TP is the type of CA: 'P'/'NP' expresses a control action that is or is not issued; 'PWS' describes that the control actions are provided in the wrong sequence; 'PTE'/'PTL' means the control action is provided too early/late. Since most control actions in the computer-controlled system are discrete, the duration of the control action is not considered in this paper for convenience. Besides the normal control actions and control action sequences, the sequences of the control actions and transitions that arise from the timing failures of control actions can also be expressed in the extended reachability graph with the help of control action failures. Figure 3 shows an extended reachability graphs when there are HCAs, where the rectangle/ellipse denotes the hazardous/safe state, ca and ca' are the control actions, ca-f and ca'-f are the control action failures, and t is the normal transition.
According to the expression of HCA, the provided condition of control action is an important guide condition for HCA identification. As shown in Figure 3(a) , if the occurrence of ca' or failure of ca' will lead to the hazardous state M3, then there is an HCA: (SC, P, ca', M1 ). There are two situations of HCAs caused by not providing the required control actions. For one thing, since the optional control action ca can be provided under M1 to prevent the occurrence of ca'/t, which will lead the system into hazardous state M3 as shown in Figure 3(a) , not providing ca under M1 is hazardous. There is an HCA: (SC, NP, ca, M1). In addition, as shown in Figure 3( Figure 3 . The hazardous control actions in the extended reachability graph
The temporal factors of safe control actions are other important guide conditions for HCA identification. Incorrect sequence of control actions is one of the most important accident causal factors and has not been extensively studied by most safety analysis methods. As shown in Figure 3(c) , ca and ca' are two control actions in the control process, and <ca, ca'> is a safe control action sequence started from safe state M1. If there is a transition sequence <ca', ca>, which may be caused by failures or design flaws, a hazardous state can be reached from the same state M1 in the extended reachability graph. This means that ca and ca' will lead to the hazard when they are provided out of the sequence < ca, ca'>, and then the HCA: (SC, PWS, <ca, ca'>, M1) can be obtained.
The provided timing failures of control actions may also affect the sequences between the control actions and the transitions of context and lead to system hazards. All the possible sequences of transitions with the considerations of failures can be described in the extended reachability graph of CLPN. As shown in Figure 3(d) , a control action ca should be provided in the state M2 in normal situation. This is to say, the occurring of sequence <t, ca> under M1 is safe. If the ca is provided too early before the occurring of context transition t, which changes the state from M1 to M2, then ca will lead to hazardous state M3 directly in the extended reachability graph. As a result, there is an HCA: (SC, PTE, ca, M2) . Similarly, as shown in Figure 3 (e), in normal situations, the occurrence of the control action ca under M1 is safe. If ca is provided too late after the context has changed from M1 to M2 by context transition t, then the sequence <t, ca> is generated and ca in this sequence will lead to hazardous state M3 directly, so the HCA: (SC, PTL, ca, M1) can be obtained. Also, as shown in Figure  3 (f) and Figure 3(g) , the control action (failure) ca can change the system state from M1 to M2, and the context transition t can occur before or after the firing of ca. If the occurrence of t under M1/M2 is safe/hazardous, then ca is provided too early before t under M1 to lead to a hazardous state, and there is an HCA: (SC, PTE, ca, M1). Conversely, if the occurrence of t under M1/M2 is hazardous/safe, there is an HCA: (SC, PTL, ca, M1).
According to the content above, with the help of the extended reachability graph of CLPN, the hazardous states can be traced back to the control failures and used to identify the related HCAs as causal factors by following Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3: Hazardous Control Action identification algorithm:
Input: The extended reachability graph of CLPN.
Output: The HCAs.
Step 1 Identify all the hazardous states in the reachability graph. Search backward from a hazardous state Step 2 Search forward from a hazardous state M1, if ∃ M1[ca>M2, where M2 is a safe state, then ∃ HCA: (SC, NP, ca, M1).
Step 3 Step Searching backward from the hazardous state M2 in the extended reachability graph of Figure 2 with Algorithm 3, four HCAs can be obtained: (SC, P, t4, M5), (SC, NP, t3, M1), (SC, PTL, t3, M1) , and (SC, PTE, t4, M6). As shown in Figure 2 , the failure of control action t4 can lead to M2 from M5, and the HCA: (SC, P, t4, M5 ) is identified. Since the control action t3 under M1 can prevent t1 from making the system a hazardous state, the HCA: (SC, NP, t3, M1) can be obtained in Step 1. Because the transition t1 can lead to a hazardous state under M1, and the occurrence of t1 after t3 is safe, there is an HCA: (SC, PTL, t3, M1 ). The HCA: (SC, PTE, t4, M6 ) can be identified in Step 4, which means that if t4 is provided too early before the t2 changes the state from M5 to M6, then there will be a hazard. Also, t1 can change the system state from M1 to M2, but t1 is not a control action, so this cannot identify an HCA. This is similar for the context transition t2, which can lead M2 to safe state M3.
Case Study
A simplified Automobile System is given as a case study to evaluate our approach [24] . As shown by the control structure in Figure 4 , the Automobiles System incorporates Anti-lock Brakes (AB), Auto Hold (AH), Engine Stop-Start (ESS), Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC), Brakes, Engine, Driver, and other systems. They are divided into three levels: the AH, Driver, ACC, and AB components impose constraints on Brakes independently; the Driver, ACC, and ESS impose constraints on Engine independently; the Driver also can control the AH, AB, ACC, and ESS to impose constraints on Brake and Engine indirectly. These control flow are denoted as solid arrows. The Control Interactions between the auto-control components like AH and AB and the controlled components Brakes and Engine describe the critical control processes of the system. In the control structure, the states of Engine and Brakes are detected and receive feedback from Other systems, which are denoted by dotted arrows. System variables of components are shown in dotted rectangles. Due to length limitations, only the control processes of AB and ACC components in Figure 5 shows the CLPN model of control processes in ACC and AB components generated with Algorithm 1. According to Step 1 of Algorithm 1, the context information, such as the states of WheelSlipRation and VehicleSpeed, is expressed by places P0, P1, P9, and P10, and the ways of state changing is also expressed by the transitions, such as t0, t1, and FN arcs of CLPN. The control actions, such as ACC.accel, are used to generate logical transitions CA in Figure 5 . In accordance with the provided condition of each control action as shown in Table 1 , such as AB.applyBrake: (Wheel_SlipRation=NotSlipping) ⋀ (Wheel_Speed = Moving), the FR arcs, such as <P1, t3>, <P2, t3>, are generated and denoted by dotted arrows. The logical expression of logical transitions CA can be obtained using Step 2 of Algorithm 1. Also, the Brake and ThrottleAngle to be controlled in the control process are denoted by places like P3 and P4, following Step 3 of Algorithm 1.
Control Process Modeling and Hazard Analysis
There are 32 states and 120 transitions in the original reachability graph of the Automobile System model, and 18 hazardous states can be identified with the given hazards. All the hazardous states should be considered with the failures of control actions through Algorithm 2 to extend the reachability graph. Figure 6 shows part of the extended reachability graph, and the hazardous states are expressed by rectangles. For example, there is a hazard H3 in state M1: (1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0 , 0, 1), when Distance<SafeDistance (P5) and ThrottleAngle=Opening (P7). Only the control action Acc.accel (t9) can lead ThrottleAngle to Opening state. The failure of this control action should be considered to work backward from M1, and the state (1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1) can be generated, which is the M10 in the reachability graph. Therefore, the control action failure t9-f is added from M10 to M1. In the extended reachability graph of the CLPN in Figure 5 , there are only 26 more control action failures. This is because a lot of hazardous states are caused by the context transitions rather than the control action, and many of the control actions, which affect hazardous states, are already in the graph. From the extended reachability graph, all the HCAs can be identified with Algorithm 3. For instance, searching backward from the hazardous state M9 following Step 1, the control action t9 can lead to it from hazardous state M15, and the control action t3 can lead to M9 from safe state M3. Therefore, the HCA: (AB, P, t3, M3) can be identified. There is only one HCA caused by providing unsafe control in the control process of normal situations, but 15 control action failures, which act in wrong situations, can lead to hazardous states. No control actions can prevent the occurrence of other transitions, which will lead the system into hazardous states, so HCAs caused by not provided safe control action cannot be identified in this step. When searching forward from the hazardous state M4 following Step 2, the control action t2 can eliminate the hazard and achieve a safe state M10, so the HCA: (AB, NP, t2, M4) is obtained. Similarly, 7 more HCAs can be identified. In the case of control action sequence <t2, t9> from M13, the wrong sequence <t9, t2> will reach the safe state M0. There is no HCA caused by incorrect sequences of control actions in the Automobile System. Also, 12 HCAs caused by provided too early and 6 HCAs caused by provided too late can be identified in Step 4. For example, control action t9 is safe when fired in M30, when it is provided too early before t4/t6 and fired in M21/M27, it will lead to hazardous state M6/M8, and HCA: (ACC, PTE, t9, M30) is identified. Also, when the control action t3 is provided too early before t1 under M21, the occurring of t1 will lead to hazardous state M4, and HCA: (AB, PTE, t3, M21) is obtained. If the control action t3 is provided too late in M27 after t1 fired, the hazardous state M7 can be reached, and HCA: (AB, PTL, t3, M27) is obtained. The HCAs identified from the extended reachable graph of Figure 6 are shown in Table 2 . Table 2 . The hazardous control action of Automobile Systembe considered at every state of the system. There are 34 more arcs in the reachability graph of the Automobile System. However, only 26 arcs are extended to the reachability graph as control action failures in our Petri nets based method. The reason for this is that the control action failures are only considered for the 18 hazardous states; the failures, which cannot lead to hazards, are useless for hazard analysis and are thus omitted from our method. Additionally, the logical transition of the CLPN mitigates the state space explosion problem to a certain extent [17, 20] .
Our work has some limitations on hazard analysis when there are durational failures of control action in the control process. One direction for further work is to extend the CLPN with timing information for system modeling and hazard analysis.
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to analyze system hazards with the help of Petri nets and identify hazardous control actions as the causal factors based on the causality model STAMP. Hence, the CLPN is proposed to describe the control processes in system control structures. Also, the reachability graph of CLPN is extended backward from hazardous states with the control action failures for the hazard analysis. Furthermore, the types of hazardous control actions that will lead a system to hazardous states have been studied in the extended reachability graph of CLPN, and then a hazard analysis method has been presented to identify the hazardous control actions. The case study demonstrates that the CLPN based method works well in hazard analysis with STAMP.
